The greatest part of those
men who have written ought concerning commonwealths, either suppose,
or require us, or beg of us to believe, That man is a creature born
fit for society: The Greeks call him zoon politikon [a
political animal], and on this foundation they so build up the
doctrine of civil society, as if for the preservation of peace, and
the government of mankind there were nothing else necessary, than that
men should agree to make certain covenants and conditions together,
which themselves should then call laws. Which axiom, though received
by most, is yet certainly false, and an error proceeding from our too
slight contemplation of human nature; for they who shall more narrowly
look into the causes for which men come together, and delight in each
others company, shall easily find that this happens not because
naturally it could happen no otherwise, but by accident: For if by
nature one man should love another (that is) as man, there could no
reason be returned why every man should not equally love every man, as
being equally man, or why he should rather frequent those whose
society affords him honour or profit. We do not therefore by nature
seek society for its own sake, but that we may receive some honour or
profit from it; these we desire primarily, that secondarily.
How by what advice men do meet, will be best known by observing those things which they do when they are met: For if they meet for traffic, it's plain every man regards not his fellow, but his business; if to discharge some office, a certain market-friendship is begotten, which hath more of jealousy in it than true love, and whence factions sometimes may arise, but good will never. If for pleasure, and recreation of mind, every man is wont to please himself most with those things which stir up laughter, whence he may (according to the nature of that which is ridiculous) by comparison of another man's defects and infirmities, pass the more currant in his own opinion; and although this be sometimes innocent, and without offence; yet it is manifest they are not so much delighted with the society, as their own vain glory. But for the most part, in these kind of meetings, we wound the absent; their whole life, sayings, actions are examined, judged, condemned; nay, it is very rare, but some present receive a fling before they part, so as his reason was not ill, who was wont always at parting to go out last. And these are indeed the true delights of society, unto which we are carried by nature, (i.e.) by those passions which are incident to all creatures, until either by sad experience, or good precepts, it so fall out (which in many never happens) that the appetite, of present matters, be dulled with the memory of things past, without which, the discourse of most quick and nimble men, on this subject, is but cold and hungry.
. All society therefore is either for gain, or for glory; (i.e.) not so much for love of our fellows, as for love of ourselves: but no society can be great, or lasting, which begins from vain glory; because that glory is like honour - if all men have it, no man hath it - for they consist in comparison and precellence. Neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying in myself; for every man must account himself, such as he can make himself, without the help of others. But though the benefits of this life may be much furthered by mutual help, since yet those may be better attained to by dominion, than by the society of others: I hope nobody will doubt but that men would much more greedily be carried by nature, if all fear were removed, to obtain dominion, than to gain society. We must therefore resolve, that the original of all great, and lasting societies, consisted not in the mutual good will men had towards each other, but in the mutual fear they had of each other.
III. The cause of mutual fear consists partly in the natural equality of men, partly in their mutual will of hurting: whence it comes to pass that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to ourselves the least security: For if we look on men full-grown, and consider how brittle the frame of our human body is, (which perishing, all its strength, vigour, and wisdom itself perisheth with it) and how easy a matter it is, even for the weakest man to kill the strongest, there is no reason why any man trusting to his own strength should conceive himself made by nature above others: they are equals who can do equal things one against the other; but they who can do the greatest things, (namely kill) can do equal things. All men therefore among themselves are by nature equal; the inequality we now discern, hath its spring from the civil law.
VII. Among so many dangers therefore, as the natural lusts of men do daily threaten each other withal, to have a care of oneself is not a matter so scornfully to be looked upon, as if so be there had not been a power and will left in one to have done otherwise. For every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he doth, by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward. It is therefore neither absurd, nor reprehensible; neither against the dictates of true reason for a man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his body, and the members thereof from death and sorrows; but that which is not contrary to right reason, that all men account to be done justly, and with right. Neither by the word Right is any thing else signified, than that liberty which every man hath to make use of his natural faculties according to right reason. Therefore the first foundation of natural Right is this, That every man as much as in him lies endeavour to protect his life and members.
VIII. But because it is in vain for a man to have a Right to the end, if the Right to the necessary means be denied him; it follows, that since every man hath a Right to preserve himself, he must also be allowed a Right to use all the means, and do all the actions, without which he cannot preserve himself.
IX. But the act of two or more, mutually conveying their Rights, is called a Contract. But in every Contract, either both parties instantly perform what they contract for, insomuch as there is no trust had from either to other; or the one performs, the other is trusted, or neither perform. Where both parties perform presently, there the Contract is ended, as soon as 'tis performed. But where there is credit given either to one, or both, there the party trusted promiseth after-performance; and this kind of promise is called a COVENANT.
XI. But the Covenants, which are made in contract of mutual trust, neither party performing out of hand, if there arise a just suspicion in either of them, are in the state of nature invalid. For he that first performs - by reason of the wicked disposition of the greatest part of men studying their own advantage, either by right, or wrong - exposeth himself to the perverse will of him with whom he hath contracted. For it suits not with reason, that any man should perform first, if it be not likely that the other will make good his promise after; which, whether it be probable, or not, he that doubts it, must be judge of Thus, I say, things stand in the state of nature. But in a civil state, when there is a power which can compel both parties, he that hath contracted to perform first, must first perform; because, that since the other may be compelled, the cause which made him fear the others non-performance, ceaseth.
XXXIII. But those which we call the Laws of nature (since they are nothing else but certain conclusions understood by reason, of things to be done, and omitted; but a law to speak properly and accurately, is the speech of him who by right commands somewhat to others to be done, or omitted) are not (in propriety of speech) laws, as they proceed from nature. Yet as they are delivered by God in holy Scriptures , they are most properly called by the name of laws: for the sacred Scripture is the speech of God commanding over all things by greatest right.
VI. Since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth not suffice to preserve peace, and to make a lasting defence, it is requisite that in those necessary matters which concern peace and self-defence, there be but one will of all men. But this cannot be done, unless every man will so subject his will to some other one, to wit, either Man or Council, that whatsoever his will is in those things which are necessary to the common peace, it be received for the wills of all men in general, and of every one in particular.
XI. In every city, That Man or Council, to whose will each particular man hath subjected his will (so as hath been declared) is said to have the SUPREME POWER, or CHIEF COMMAND, or DOMINION; which power, and right of commanding, consists in this, that each Citizen hath conveyed all his strength and power to that man, or Council; which to have done (because no man can transfer his power in a natural manner) is nothing else than to have parted with his right of resisting. Each citizen, as also every subordinate civil person, is called the SUBJECT of him who hath the chief command.
II. Whatsoever any man doth against his conscience is a sin, for he who doth so, contemns the law. But we must distinguish: That is my sin indeed, which committing, I do believe to be my sin; but what I believe to be another man's sin, I may sometimes do that without any sin of mine. For if I be commanded to do that which is a sin in him who commands me, if I do it, and he that commands me be by right, lord over me, I sin not. For if I wage war at the commandment of my Prince, conceiving the war to be unjustly undertaken, I do not therefore do unjustly, but rather if I refuse to do it, arrogating to myself the knowledge of what is just and unjust, which pertains only to my Prince. They who observe not this distinction, will fall into a necessity of sinning, as oft as anything is commanded them, which either is, or seems to be unlawful to them: for if they obey, they sin against their conscience, and if they obey not, against right. If they sin against their conscience, they declare that they fear not the pains of the world to come; if they sin against right, they do as much as in them lies, abolish human society, and the civil life of the present world. Their opinion therefore who teach, that subjects sin when they obey their Princes' commands, which to them seem unjust, is both erroneous, and to be reckoned among those which are contrary to civil obedience; and it depends upon that original error For by our taking upon us to judge of good and evil, we are the occasion, that as well our obedience, as disobedience, becomes sin unto us.
III. The third seditious doctrine springs from the same root, That Tyrannicide is lawful; Nay, at this day it is by many divines, and of old it was by all the philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek, and Roman Anarchies, held not only lawful, but even worthy of the greatest praise. And under the title of Tyrants, they mean not only Monarchs, but all those who bear the chief rule in any Government whatsoever; for not Pisistratus only at Athens, but those thirty also who succeeded him, and ruled together, were all called Tyrants. But he, whom men require to be put to death as being a Tyrant, commands either by right, or without right. If without right, he is an enemy, and by right to be put to death; but then this must not be called the killing a Tyrant, but an enemy. If by right, then the divine interrogation takes place, Who hath told thee that he was a Tyrant, hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? For why dost thou call him a Tyrant, whom God hath made a King, except that thou being a private Person, usurpest to thyself the knowledge of good and evil? But how pernicious this opinion is to all governments, but especially to that which is monarchical, we may hence discern, namely, that by it every King, whether good or ill, stands exposed to be condemned by the judgment, and slain by the hand of every murderous villain.
XVII. We have already declared which were
the laws of God, as well sacred as secular, in his government by the
way of nature only. Now because there is no man but may be deceived in
reasoning, and that it so falls out, that men are of different
opinions concerning the most actions, it may be demanded farther, whom
God would have to be the interpreter of right reason, that is
to say, of his laws. And as for the secular laws, I mean those which
concern justice, and the carriage of men towards men; by what hath
been said before of the constitution of a City, we have
demonstratively showed it agreeable to reason, that all judicature
belongs to the City, and that judicature is nothing else but an
interpretation of the laws, and by consequence, that everywhere
Cities, that is to say, those who have the sovereign power, are the
interpreters of the laws.
As for the sacred laws, we must consider what hath been before demonstrated in the fifth Chap. the 13. art. that every subject hath transferred as much right as he could on him or them, who had the supreme authority. But he could have transferred his right of judging the manner how God is to be honoured, and therefore also he hath done it. That he could, it appears hence, that the manner of honouring God before the constitution of a City was to be fetched from every man's private reason; but every man can subject his private reason to the reason of the whole City. Moreover, if each man should follow his own reason in the worshipping of God, in so great a diversity of worshippers, one would be apt to judge another's worship uncomely, or impious; neither would the one seem to the other to honour God. Even that therefore which were most consonant to reason, would not be a worship, because that the nature of worship consists in this, that it be the sign of inward honour; but there is no sign but whereby somewhat becomes known to others, and therefore is there no sign of honour but what seems so to others. Again, that's a true sign which by the consent of men becomes a sign; therefore also that is honourable, which by the consent of men, that is to say, by the command of the City, becomes a sign of honour. It is not therefore against the will of God, declared by the way of reason only, to give him such signs of honour as the City shall command. Wherefore subjects can transfer their right of judging the manner of God's worship on him or them who have the sovereign power. Nay, they must do it, for else all manner of absurd opinions, concerning the nature of God, and all ridiculous ceremonies which have been used by any nations, will be seen at once in the same City. Whence it will fall out, that every man will believe that all the rest do offer God an affront; so that it cannot be truly said of any that he worships God; for no man worships God, that is to say, honours him outwardly, but he who doth those things, whereby he appears to others for to honour him. It may therefore bee concluded, that the interpretation of all Laws, as well sacred as secular, (God ruling by the way of nature only) depends on the authority of the City, that is to say, that man or council, to whom the sovereign power is committed. And that whatsoever God commands, he commands by his voice. And on the other side, that whatsoever is commanded by them, both concerning the manner of honouring God, and concerning secular affaires, is commanded by God himself.
V. We have seen therefore what it is to believe. But what is it to believe in CHRIST? Or what proposition is that which is the object of our faith in CHRIST? For when we say, I believe in CHRIST, we signify indeed Whom, but not What we believe. Now, to believe in CHRIST is nothing else but to believe that JESUS IS THE CHRIST, namely He, who according to the prophesies of Moses, and the Prophets of Israel, was to come into this world to institute the Kingdom of God. And this sufficiently appears out of the words of CHRIST himself to Martha: I am (saith he) the Resurrection and the life, HE THAT BELIEVETH IN ME, though he were dead, yet he shall live, and WHOSOEVER LIVETH, AND BELIEVETH IN ME, shall never dye. Believest thou this? She saith unto him, Yea Lord, I believe that THOU ART THE CHRIST the Son of God, which should come into the world. John 11. ver. 25, 26, 27. In which words we see that the question BELIEVEST THOU IN ME? is expounded by the answer, THOU ART THE CHRIST. To believe in CHRIST therefore is nothing else but to believe JESUS HIMSELF saying that he is THE CHRIST.
NATURE (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of Nature, man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a Commonwealth, or State (in Latin, civitas), which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment (by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty, every joint and member is moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, that do the same in the body natural; the wealth and riches of all the particular members are the strength; salus populi (the people's safety) its business; counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity and laws, an artificial reason and will; concord, health; sedition, sickness; and civil war, death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the creation.
The imaginations of them
that sleep are those we call dreams. And these also (as all other
imaginations) have been before, either totally or by parcels, in the
sense. And because in sense, the brain and nerves, which are the
necessary organs of sense, are so benumbed in sleep as not easily to
be moved by the action of external objects, there can happen in sleep
no imagination, and therefore no dream, but what proceeds from the
agitation of the inward parts of man's body; which inward parts, for
the connection they have with the brain and other organs, when they be
distempered do keep the same in motion. Whereby the imaginations there
formerly made, appear as if a man were waking; saving that the organs
of sense being now benumbed, so as there is no new object which can
master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a dream must
needs be more clear, in this silence of sense, than are our waking
thoughts. And hence it cometh to pass that it is a hard matter, and by
many thought impossible, to distinguish exactly between sense and
dreaming. For my part, when I consider that in dreams I do not often
nor constantly think of the same persons, places, objects, and actions
that I do waking, nor remember so long a train of coherent thoughts
dreaming as at other times; and because waking I often observe the
absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking
thoughts, I am well satisfied that, being awake, I know I dream not;
though when I dream, I think myself awake.
And seeing dreams are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the body, diverse distempers must needs cause different dreams. And hence it is that lying cold breedeth dreams of fear, and raiseth the thought and image of some fearful object, the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the brain being reciprocal. And that as anger causeth heat in some parts of the body when we are awake, so when we sleep the overheating of the same parts causeth anger, and raiseth up in the brain the imagination of an enemy. In the same manner, as natural kindness when we are awake causeth desire, and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also too much heat in those parts, while we sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shown. In sum, our dreams are the reverse of our waking imaginations; the motion when we are awake beginning at one end, and when we dream, at another.
The most difficult discerning of a man's dream from his waking thoughts is, then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept: which is easy to happen to a man full of fearful thoughts; and whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth without the circumstances of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chair. For he that taketh pains, and industriously lays himself to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a dream. We read of Marcus Brutus (one that had his life given him by Julius Caesar, and was also his favorite, and notwithstanding murdered him), how at Philippi, the night before he gave battle to Augustus Caesar, he saw a fearful apparition, which is commonly related by historians as a vision, but, considering the circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a short dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horror of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him; which fear, as by degrees it made him wake, so also it must needs make the apparition by degrees to vanish. And having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a dream, or anything but a vision. And this is no very rare accident: for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous and superstitious, possessed with fearful tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead men's ghosts walking in churchyards; whereas it is either their fancy only, or else the knavery of such persons as make use of such superstitious fear to pass disguised in the night to places they would not be known to haunt.
From this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from vision and sense, did arise the greatest part of the religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped satyrs, fauns, nymphs, and the like; and nowadays the opinion that rude people have of fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and of the power of witches. For, as for witches, I think not that their witchcraft is any real power, but yet that they are justly punished for the false belief they have that they can do such mischief, joined with their purpose to do it if they can, their trade being nearer to a new religion than to a craft or science. And for fairies, and walking ghosts, the opinion of them has, I think, been on purpose either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the use of exorcism, of crosses, of holy water, and other such inventions of ghostly men. Nevertheless, there is no doubt but God can make unnatural apparitions: but that He does it so often as men need to fear such things more than they fear the stay or change, of the course of nature, which he also can stay and change, is no point of Christian faith. But evil men, under pretext that God can do anything, are so bold as to say anything when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; it is the part of a wise man to believe them no further than right reason makes that which they say appear credible. If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it prognostics from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience.
Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man
that seeketh precise truth had need to remember what every name he
uses stands for, and to place it accordingly; or else he will find
himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime twigs; the more he
struggles, the more be-limed. And therefore in geometry (which is the
only science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind),
men begin at settling the significations of their words; which
settling of significations, they call definitions, and place them in
the beginning of their reckoning.
By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge to examine the definitions of former authors; and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down, or to make them himself. For the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lies the foundation of their errors. From whence it happens that they which trust to books do as they that cast up many little sums into a greater, without considering whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the error visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to clear themselves, spend time in fluttering over their books; as birds that entering by the chimney, and finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glass window for want of wit to consider which way they came in. So that in the right definition of names lies the first use of speech; which is the acquisition of science: and in wrong, or no definitions, lies the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senseless tenets. Which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men as men endued with true science are above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. Natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err: and as men abound in copiousness of language; so they become more wise, or more mad, than ordinary. Nor is it possible without letters for any man to become either excellently wise or (unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words are wise men's counters; they do but reckon by them: but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man.
The value or worth of a man is, as of all other things, his price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power, and therefore is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgement of another. An able conductor of soldiers is of great price in time of war present or imminent, but in peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt judge is much worth in time of peace, but not so much in war. And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the price. For let a man, as most men do, rate themselves at the highest value they can, yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others.
This perpetual fear, always
accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the
dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there
is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse either of their good
or evil fortune but some power or agent invisible: in which sense
perhaps it was that some of the old poets said that the gods were at
first created by human fear: which, spoken of the gods (that is to
say, of the many gods of the Gentiles), is very true. But the
acknowledging of one God eternal, infinite, and omnipotent may more
easily be derived from the desire men have to know the causes of
natural bodies, and their several virtues and operations, than from
the fear of what was to befall them in time to come. For he that, from
any effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next and
immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause,
and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes, shall at last
come to this, that there must be (as even the heathen philosophers
confessed) one First Mover; that is, a first and an eternal cause of
all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God. And all
this without thought of their fortune, the solicitude whereof both
inclines to fear and hinders them from the search of the causes of
other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many gods
as there be men that feign them.
And for the matter, or substance, of the invisible agents, so fancied, they could not by natural cogitation fall upon any other concept but that it was the same with that of the soul of man; and that the soul of man was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a dream to one that sleepeth; or in a looking-glass to one that is awake. Which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the fancy, think to be real and external substances, and therefore call them ghosts; as the Latins called them imagines and umbrae and thought them spirits (that is, thin aerial bodies), and those invisible agents, which they feared, to be like them, save that they appear and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such spirits were incorporeal, or immaterial, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as spirit and incorporeal, yet they can never have the imagination of anything answering to them. And therefore, men that by their own meditation arrive to the acknowledgement of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God choose rather to confess He is incomprehensible and above their understanding than to define His nature by spirit incorporeal, and then confess their definition to be unintelligible. Or if they give him such a title, it is not dogmatically, with intention to make the Divine Nature understood, but piously, to honour Him with attributes of significations as remote as they can from the grossness of bodies visible.
NATURE hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself.
So that in the nature of
man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition;
secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.
The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.
Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man. For war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
It may seem strange to some
man that has not well weighed these things that Nature should thus
dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another: and
he may therefore, not trusting to this inference, made from the
passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let
him therefore consider with himself: when taking a journey, he arms
himself and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he
locks his doors; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this
when he knows there be laws and public officers, armed, to revenge all
injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow
subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when he locks
his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his
chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I
do by my words? But neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The
desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more
are the actions that proceed from those passions till they know a law
that forbids them; which till laws be made they cannot know, nor can
any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make
THE right of nature, which
writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man
hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of
his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of
doing anything which, in his own judgement and reason, he shall
conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
By liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments; which impediments may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left him according as his judgement and reason shall dictate to him.
A law of nature, lex naturalis, is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject use to confound jus and lex, right and law, yet they ought to be distinguished, because right consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas law determineth and bindeth to one of them: so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty, which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.
And because the condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of war of every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth that in such a condition every man has a right to every thing, even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason: that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war. The first branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of nature, which is: to seek peace and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature, which is: by all means we can to defend ourselves.
The only way to erect such a
common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of
foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure
them in such sort as that by their own industry and by the fruits of
the earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to
confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly
of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto
one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly
of men, to bear their person; and every one to own and acknowledge
himself to be -author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person
shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the
common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one
to his will, and their judgements to his judgement. This is more than
consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the
same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such
manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorise and give
up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of
men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and
authorise all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so
united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, CIVITAS.
This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak
more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the
immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this authority, given him
by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so
much power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he
is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual
aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of
the Commonwealth; which, to define it, is: one person, of whose acts a
great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made
themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength
and means of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and
And he that carrieth this person is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and every one besides, his subject.
The attaining to this sovereign power is by two ways. One, by natural force: as when a man maketh his children to submit themselves, and their children, to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse; or by war subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter may be called a political Commonwealth, or Commonwealth by Institution; and the former, a Commonwealth by acquisition.
Seventhly, is annexed to the
sovereignty the whole power of prescribing the rules whereby every man
may know what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, without
being molested by any of his fellow subjects: and this is it men call
propriety. For before constitution of sovereign power, as hath already
been shown, all men had right to all things, which necessarily causeth
war: and therefore this propriety, being necessary to peace, and
depending on sovereign power, is the act of that power, in order to
the public peace. These rules of propriety (or meum and tuum)
and of good, evil, lawful, and unlawful in the actions of subjects are
the civil laws; that is to say, the laws of each Commonwealth in
particular; though the name of civil law be now restrained to the
ancient civil laws of the city of Rome; which being the head of a
great part of the world, her laws at that time were in these parts the
But a man may here object that the condition of subjects is very miserable, as being obnoxious to the lusts and other irregular passions of him or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands. And commonly they that live under a monarch think it the fault of monarchy; and they that live under the government of democracy, or other sovereign assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that form of Commonwealth; whereas the power in all forms, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same: not considering that the estate of man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest that in any form of government can possibly happen to the people in general is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries and horrible calamities that accompany a civil war, or that dissolute condition of masterless men without subjection to laws and a coercive power to tie their hands from rapine and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of sovereign governors proceedeth, not from any delight or profit they can expect in the damage weakening of their subjects, in whose vigour consisteth their own strength and glory, but in the restiveness of themselves that, unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for their governors to draw from them what they can in time of peace that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist or take advantage on their enemies. For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses (that is their passions and self-love) through which every little payment appeareth a great grievance, but are destitute of those prospective glasses (namely moral and civil science) to see afar off the miseries that hang over them and cannot without such payments be avoided.
Dominion is acquired two
ways: by generation and by conquest. The right of dominion by
generation is that which the parent hath over his children, and is
called paternal. And is not so derived from the generation, as if
therefore the parent had dominion over his child because he begat him,
but from the child's consent, either express or by other sufficient
arguments declared. For as to the generation, God hath ordained to man
a helper, and there be always two that are equally parents: the
dominion therefore over the child should belong equally to both, and
he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man can
obey two masters. And whereas some have attributed the dominion to the
man only, as being of the more excellent sex, they misreckon in it.
For there is not always that difference of strength or prudence
between the man and the woman as that the right can be determined
without war. In Commonwealths this controversy is decided by the civil
law: and for the most part, but not always, the sentence is in favour
of the father, because for the most part Commonwealths have been
erected by the fathers, not by the mothers of families. But the
question lieth now in the state of mere nature where there are
supposed no laws of matrimony, no laws for the education of children,
but the law of nature and the natural inclination of the sexes, one to
another, and to their children. In this condition of mere nature,
either the parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over the
child by contract, or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose
thereof, the right passeth according to the contract. We find in
history that the Amazons contracted with the men of the neighbouring
countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue male
should be sent back, but the female remain with themselves: so that
the dominion of the females was in the mother.
If there be no contract, the dominion is in the mother. For in the condition of mere nature, where there are no matrimonial laws, it cannot be known who is the father unless it be declared by the mother; and therefore the right of dominion over the child dependeth on her will, and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the infant is first in the power of the mother, so as she may either nourish or expose it; if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the mother, and is therefore obliged to obey her rather than any other; and by consequence the dominion over it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find and nourish it, dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved, because preservation of life being the end for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience to him in whose power it is to save or destroy him.
If the mother be the father's subject, the child is in the father's power; and if the father be the mother's subject (as when a sovereign queen marrieth one of her subjects), the child is subject to the mother, because the father also is her subject.
He that hath the dominion over the child hath dominion also over the children of the child, and over their children's children. For he that hath dominion over the person of a man hath dominion over all that is his, without which dominion were but a title without the effect.
Dominion acquired by
conquest, or victory in war, is that which some writers call despotical from Despotes, which signifieth a lord or master,
and is the dominion of the master over his servant. And this dominion
is then acquired to the victor when the vanquished, to avoid the
present stroke of death, covenanteth, either in express words or by
other sufficient signs of the will, that so long as his life and the
liberty of his body is allowed him, the victor shall have the use
thereof at his pleasure. And after such covenant made, the vanquished
is a servant, and not before: for by the word servant (whether it be
derived from servire, to serve, or from servare, to
save, which I leave to grammarians to dispute) is not meant a captive,
which is kept in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took
him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with
him: for such men, commonly called slaves, have no obligation at all;
but may break their bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away
captive their master, justly: but one that, being taken, hath corporal
liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do
violence to his master, is trusted by him.
It is not therefore the victory that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he cometh in and submitteth to the victor; nor is the victor obliged by an enemy's rendering himself, without promise of life, to spare him for this his yielding to discretion; which obliges not the victor longer than in his own discretion he shall think fit.
4. The law of nature and the
civil law contain each other and are of equal extent. For the laws of
nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude, and other moral
virtues on these depending, in the condition of mere nature (as I have
said before in the end of the fifteenth Chapter), are not properly
laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and to obedience. When a
Commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws, and not
before; as being then the commands of the Commonwealth; and therefore
also civil laws: for it is the sovereign power that obliges men to
obey them. For the differences of private men, to declare what is
equity, what is justice, and is moral virtue, and to make them
binding, there is need of the ordinances of sovereign power, and
punishments to be ordained for such as shall break them; which
ordinances are therefore part of the civil law. The law of nature
therefore is a part of the civil law in all Commonwealths of the
world. Reciprocally also, the civil law is a part of the dictates of
nature. For justice, that is to say, performance of covenant, and
giving to every man his own, is a dictate of the law of nature. But
every subject in a Commonwealth hath covenanted to obey the civil law;
either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common
representative, or with the representative itself one by one when,
subdued by the sword, they promise obedience that they may receive
life; and therefore obedience to the civil law is part also of the law
of nature. Civil and natural law are not different kinds, but
different parts of law; whereof one part, being written, is called
civil the other unwritten, natural. But the right of nature, that is,
the natural liberty of man, may by the civil law be abridged and
restrained: nay, the end of making laws is no other but such
restraint, without which there cannot possibly be any peace. And law
was brought into the world for nothing else but to limit the natural
liberty of particular men in such manner as they might not hurt, but
assist one another, and join together against a common enemy.
In the second place, I
observe the diseases of a Commonwealth that proceed from the poison of
seditious doctrines, whereof one is that every private man is judge of
good and evil actions. This is true in the condition of mere nature,
where there are no civil laws; and also under civil government in such
cases as are not determined by the law. But otherwise, it is manifest
that the measure of good and evil actions is the civil law; and the
judge the legislator, who is always representative of the
Commonwealth. From this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate
with themselves and dispute the commands of the Commonwealth, and
afterwards to obey or disobey them as in their private judgments they
shall think fit; whereby the Commonwealth is distracted and weakened.
Another doctrine repugnant to civil society is that whatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin; and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of good and evil. For a man's conscience and his judgement is the same thing; and as the judgement, so also the conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no civil law sinneth in all he does against his conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason, yet it is not so with him that lives in a Commonwealth, because the law is the public conscience by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity as there is of private consciences, which are but private opinions, the Commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the sovereign power farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.
It hath been also commonly taught that faith and sanctity are not to be attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration or infusion. Which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason of his faith; or why every Christian should not be also a prophet; or why any man should take the law of his country rather than his own inspiration for the rule of his action. And thus we fall again into the fault of taking upon us to judge of good and evil; or to make judges of it such private men as pretend to be supernaturally inspired, to the dissolution of all civil government. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those accidents which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us; which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty, and yet are not supernatural, but only, for the great number of them that concur to every effect, unobservable. Faith and sanctity are indeed not very frequent; but yet they are not miracles, but brought to pass by education, discipline, correction, and other natural ways by which God worketh them in His elect, at such time as He thinketh fit. And these three opinions, pernicious to peace and government, have in this part of the world proceeded chiefly from tongues and pens of unlearned divines; who, joining the words of Holy Scripture together otherwise is agreeable to reason, do what they can to make men think that sanctity and natural reason cannot stand together.
A fourth opinion repugnant to the nature of a Commonwealth is this: that he that hath the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws. It is true that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature, because such laws be divine and divine and cannot by any man or Commonwealth be abrogated. But to those laws which the sovereign himself, that is, which the Commonwealth, maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to laws is to be to be subject to the Commonwealth, that is, to the sovereign representative, that is, to himself which is not subjection, but freedom from the laws. Which error, because it setteth the laws above the sovereign, setteth also a judge above him, and a power to punish him; which is to make a new sovereign; and again for the same reason a third to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the confusion and dissolution of the Commonwealth.
He that will attribute to God nothing but what is warranted by natural reason must either use such negative attributes as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible; or superlatives, as most high, most great, and the like; or indefinite, as good, just, holy, creator; and in such sense as if He meant not to declare what He is (for that were to circumscribe Him within the limits of our fancy), but how much we admire Him, and how ready we would be to obey Him; which is a sign of humility, and of a will to honour Him as much as we can: for there is but one name to signify our conception of His nature, and that is I AM; and but one name of His relation to us, and that is God, in which is contained father, king, and lord.
And because words (and
consequently the attributes of God) have their signification by
agreement and constitution of men, those attributes are to be held significative of honour that men intend shall so be; and whatsoever
may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no law but
reason, may be done by the will of the Commonwealth by laws civil. And
because a Commonwealth hath no will, nor makes no laws but those that
are made by the will of him or them that have the sovereign power, it
followeth that those attributes which the sovereign ordaineth in the
worship of God for signs of honour ought to be taken and used for such
by private men in their public worship.
When God speaketh to man, it
must be either immediately or by mediation of another man, to whom He
had formerly spoken by Himself immediately. How God speaketh to a man
immediately may be understood by those well enough to whom He hath so
spoken; but how the same should be understood by another is hard, if
not impossible, to know. For if a man pretend to me that God hath
spoken to him supernaturally, and immediately, and I make doubt of it,
I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce to oblige me to
believe it. It is true that if he be my sovereign, he may oblige me to
obedience, so as not by act or word to declare I believe him not; but
not to think any otherwise than my reason persuades me. But if one
that hath not such authority over me shall pretend the same, there is
nothing that exacteth either belief or obedience.
For to say that God hath spoken to him in the Holy Scripture is not to say God hath spoken to him immediately, but by mediation of the prophets, or of the Apostles, or of the Church, in such manner as He speaks to all other Christian men. To say He hath spoken to him in a dream is no more than to say he dreamed that God spake to him; which is not of force to win belief from any man that knows dreams are for the most part natural, and may proceed from former thoughts; and such dreams as that, from self-conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of a man's own goodliness, or virtue, by which he thinks he hath merited the favour of extraordinary revelation. To say he hath seen a vision, or heard a voice, is to say that he dreamed between sleeping and waking: for in such manner a man doth many times naturally take his dream for a vision, as not having well observed his own slumbering. To say he speaks by supernatural inspiration is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can allege no natural and sufficient reason. So that though God Almighty can speak to a man by dreams, visions, voice, and inspiration, yet He obliges no man to believe He hath so done to him that pretends it; who, being a man, may err and, which is more may lie.
Seeing therefore miracles now cease, we have no sign left whereby to acknowledge the pretended revelations or inspirations of any private man; nor obligation to give ear to any doctrine, farther than it is conformable to the Holy Scriptures, which since the time of our Saviour supply the place and sufficiently recompense the want of all other prophecy; and from which, by wise and learned interpretation, and careful ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man, without enthusiasm, or supernatural inspiration, may easily be deduced.
And first, we are to
remember that the right of judging what doctrines are fit for peace,
and to be taught the subjects, is in all Commonwealths inseparably
annexed (as hath been already proved, Chapter eighteen) to the
sovereign power civil, whether it be in one man or in one assembly of
men. For it is evident to the meanest capacity that men's actions are
derived from the opinions they have of the good or evil which from
those actions redound unto themselves; and consequently, men that are
once possessed of an opinion that their obedience to the sovereign
power will be more hurtful to them than their disobedience will
disobey the laws, and thereby overthrow the Commonwealth, and
introduce confusion and civil war; for the avoiding whereof, all civil
government was ordained. And therefore in all Commonwealths of the
heathen, the sovereigns have had the name of pastors of the people,
because there was no subject that could lawfully teach the people, but
by their permission and authority.
This right of the heathen kings cannot be thought taken from them by their conversion to the faith of Christ, who never ordained that kings, for believing in him, should be deposed, that is, subjected to any but himself, or, which is all one, be deprived of the power necessary for the conservation of peace amongst their subjects and for their defence against foreign enemies. And therefore Christian kings are still the supreme pastors of their people, and have power to ordain what pastors they please, to teach the Church, that is, to teach the people committed to their charge.
All that is necessary to salvation is contained in two virtues, faith in Christ, and obedience to laws. The latter of these, if it were perfect, were enough to us. But because we are all guilty of disobedience to God's law, not only originally in Adam, but also actually by our own transgressions, there is required at our hands now, not only obedience for the rest of our time, but also a remission of sins for the time past; which remission is the reward of our faith in Christ. That nothing else is necessarily required to salvation is manifest from this, that the kingdom of heaven is shut to none but to sinners; that is to say, to the disobedient, or transgressors of the law; nor to them, in case they repent, and believe all the articles of Christian faith necessary to salvation.
The unum necessarium, only article of faith, which the Scripture maketh simply necessary to salvation is this, that Jesus is the Christ. By the name of Christ is understood the King which God had before promised by the prophets of the Old Testament to send into the world, to reign (over the Jews and over such of other nations as should believe in him) under Himself eternally; and to give them that eternal life which was lost by the sin of Adam.
To conclude, there is
nothing in this whole discourse, nor in that I wrote before of
the same subject in Latin, as far as I can perceive, contrary either
to the word of God or to good manners; or to the disturbance of the
public tranquillity. Therefore I think it may be profitably printed,
and more profitably taught in the Universities, in case they also
think so, whom the judgement of the same belongeth. For seeing the
Universities are the fountains of civil and moral doctrine, from
whence the preachers and the gentry, drawing such water as they find,
use to sprinkle the same (both from the pulpit and in their
conversation) upon the people, there ought certainly to be great care
taken, to have it pure, both from the venom of heathen politicians,
and from the incantation of deceiving spirits. And by that means the
most men, knowing their duties, will be the less subject to serve the
ambition of a few discontented persons in their purposes against the
state, and be the less grieved with the contributions necessary for
their peace and defence; and the governors themselves have the less
cause to maintain at the common charge any greater army than is
necessary to make good the public liberty against the invasions and
encroachments of foreign enemies.
And thus I have brought to an end my discourse of civil and ecclesiastical government, occasioned by the disorders of the present time, without partiality, without application, and without other design than to set before men's eyes the mutual relation between protection and obedience; of which the condition of human nature, and the laws divine, both natural and positive, require an inviolable observation. And though in the revolution of states there can be no very good constellation for truths of this nature to be born under (as having an angry aspect from the dissolvers of an old government, and seeing but the backs of them that erect a new); yet I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the public judge of doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of public peace. And in this hope I return to my interrupted speculation of bodies natural; wherein, if God give me health to finish it, I hope the novelty will as much please as in the doctrine of this artificial body it useth to offend. For such truth as opposeth no man's profit nor pleasure is to all men welcome.
[Spelling and punctuation modernized]
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was one of the greatest English philosophers. His major contribution was to political philosophy where he pioneered a radical revision of natural law and contract theory.
The full text of De Cive.
The full text of Leviathan.
Aristotle Politics, Book One, = "When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best. Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity".
precellence = excellence, superiority
Pisistratus = Ruler of Athens in the mid to late sixth century BC; his coup was popular but backed by military force.
those thirty = The oligarchs who ruled Athens in 404-03 BC.